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THE END OF De Facto ASYLUM: TOWARD A
HUMANE AND REALTISIC RESPONSE TO REFUGEE
CHALLENGES
David A. Martin*
This section of the symposium considers "Immigration and Refugees," with special attention to the latter half of the topic. That
request bespeaks concern that we might forget about refugees in
our understandable preoccupation with the new Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 1 Indeed, the request has forced me
to reflect on a likely linkage between IRCA and future refugee
problems that has been obscured in the flurry or activity attending
the new law. That linkage should command far wider understanding, so that wise policy may adjust our practices before the
problems become acute.
I.

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES:

A

BRIEF COMPARISON

It was puzzling at first, that today's topic included both immigration and refugees. Immigration plainly furnishes a worthy subject
for the mutual deliberations of U.S. and Mexican lawyers. But refugees? To be sure, similarities exist between the refugee situations
faced by the United States and by Mexico, primarily similarities
that derive from geography. Both countries are located relatively
close to Central America, a deeply troubled region that has generated many refugees and asylum seekers and will surely do so for
years to come. Nevertheless, I expect that our two nations will have
to look to sharply different responses in dealing with what appear to
be similar problems.
One hasty example illustrates the point. Most of the officially
recognized refugees in Mexico come from Guatemala. Some 40,000
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. The author wishes to thank the German
Marshal Fund of the United States and the Ford Foundation for their generous support of
the European research referred to in this article. This article is adapted from a speech
presented at the Workshop on Mexico and the United States: Strengthing the Relationship,
held at California Western School of Law, San Diego, California.
I. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1986)) (hereinafter I.R.C.A.] [popularly known as the Simpson-Rodino Act].
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have crossed Mexico's southern border, and a majority still reside
in camps along the boundary in the state of Chiapas. The United
Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) coordinates
aid to the refugees and helps run the camps. The Mexican government has also provided land in Campeche and Quintana Roo, in an
effort to move many of the refugees toward self-sufficiency as farm-

ers. But even those communities are operated, in many respects, in
a camp-like fashion.2
Despite their apparent success in the Mexican context, camps are
a most unlikely solution for any foreseeable refugee problems in the
United States. Wealthy nations cannot easily justify providing such
minimal accommodations to persons given haven. And in any event,
camps are too closely associated with our shameful experience in
interning Japanese-Americans during World War II. The United
States is more likely to maintain its customary approach even if
refugee flows expand: Recognized refugees here receive a secure
status, full rights to employment, and free movement. But as a co-

rollary, the United States enforces a policy of carefully scrutinizing
individual asylum seekers' claims to refugee status, in accordance
with the relevant United Nations treaties. This is something Mexico, by and large, has not yet felt compelled to do.3

II. De Facto ASYLUM
Despite these difficulties that may preclude addressing refugee

issues entirely within the comparative-law framework of this issue,
the topic remains of great importance. In particular, questions concerning political asylum should be claiming urgent attention here in
the United States. Although few recognize the urgency, the matter
2. See. e.g., Asylum in Mexico, Refugees Reports, October, 1986 at 19-31 [hereinafter
Asylum in Mexico]; Orme, Guatemalans Take Root in Mexico, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1987, at
A19.
3. The United States is a party to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, and thus is derivatively bound by all the important operative provisions of the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
Geneva on July 28, 1951, even though it is not technically a party to the convention. Mexico,
despite a long tradition as a country of asylum, is party to neither treaty. But my point in the
text is not meant simply as a statement about the direct application of treaties. The definition of "refugee" and other principles or standards found in the treaties are often used even
by nonparties. See generally G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I19 (1983). Mexico has generally avoided individualized determinations of refugee status,
either by treating whole groups as refugees (Guatemalans) or essentially ignoring the situation of other migrant groups (Salvadorans). See generally Asylum in Mexico, supra note 2;
Ferris, The Politics of Asylum: Mexico and the Central American Refugees, 26 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFFAIRS 357 (1984).
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is pressing because of a little-appreciated link between IRCA and
the Central American refugee situation.
Estimates of the number of Central Americans now in the
United States run as high as one million." A few thousand are already recognized as refugees or otherwise enjoy legal status under
the regular immigration provisions of our laws. A few thousand
more are in processing of various kinds, having applied for political
asylum. Statistically, their likelihood of success is low, judging from
past treatment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) of the asylum claims of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and even
Nicaraguans. Approximately three percent of Salvadorans who
have applied to INS have been granted political asylum. The figure
is less than one percent for Guatemalans. Nicaraguans have been
more successful, obtaining asylum in ten to fifteen percent of the
cases in recent years. That level is still well below what one might
expect, given the Reagan Administration's general position on the
Nicaraguan government."
These calculations leave several hundred thousand Central
Americans here, essentially underground, without legal immigration status. But consider the reality of their situation. They have
achieved a kind of de facto asylum, with most of the opportunities
they came north to seek. Their legal status is precarious, but most
have found places to live and work in this country far away from
the fighting and the human rights violations. As long as jobs have
been available, de facto asylum constituted substantial success, because illegal immigrants traditionally have incurred little risk of
discovery once they made it past the border. Moreover, the discouraging statistics from the formal asylum adjudication system doubtless have prompted many of them to rest content with de facto asy4. See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY
729-39 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
5. The statistics are somewhat elusive, and vary (as one would expect) depending on
the time period considered. I take these statistics from Refugee Reports, Dec. 12, 1986, at
14, which covers asylum decisions by INS District Directors from June 1983 to September
1986. More recent statistics show a dramatic rise in the approved rate for Nicaraguans, but
some of the change may result from temporary aberrations in the way cases are reported
from the Miami district office.
Unfortunately, all INS statistics leave out one important component of the overall United
States record on asylum. Immigration judges also consider asylum applications, but the Executive Office of Immigration Review, which includes immigration judges, unfortunately
does not compile asylum statistics by nationality. For the most comprehensive effort, to date,
of a compilation overall statistics, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM
APPLICATIONS OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED (Jan.
1987).
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lum and not risk an attempt at de jure status.6
This situation produces the link between the 1986 immigration
reform law and future refugee problems. If IRCA's employer sanctions provisions7 are reasonably effective, people lacking legal status
will have great difficulty securing jobs. As a result, many now enjoying de facto asylum will find it impossible to sustain this status.
We may then see thousands, lacking other good alternatives, showing up to apply for de jure asylum. The human rights situations in
most of the countries of Central America will lend initial plausibility to their claims.8 And even if an application is ultimately unsuccessful, it can at least provide work authorization documents while
the application is pending.9
If this happens, the rush of new applications may well swamp our
asylum adjudication system. The simple fact is that we are not well
equipped to cope with any sharp increase in volume, whether it
comes as an unforeseen and unintended result of IRCA or because
of new arrivals. We need changes, and, if I am correct about
IRCA's likely effect, we will need them fairly soon. 10
6. Incidentally, Mexico faces a somewhat similar situation with Salvadorans. Several
tens of thousands, maybe several hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans, almost all of them
without any recognized immigration status, live out a similar underground existence there as
well. See Salvadorans in Mexico, Asylum in Mexico, supra note 2, at 30-31.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A, (1986) (amended 1986) [hereinafter
I.N.A.]. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Supp. 1987).
8. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1986, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jt. Comm. Print 1987). The Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987), decided after the conference where these
remarks were delivered, relaxed the governing standards somewhat and hence makes asylum
an even more likely option.
9. Work authorization for asylum applicants used to be discretionary with INS district
directors, and across the country, those officials differed widely in their exercise of such discretion. INS's new work authorization regulations (part of the package of regulations implementing IRCA) remove that discretion and guarantee employment authorization to those
who file nonfrivolous asylum applications. The authorization lasts through the administrative
and judicial appeals process. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8), 274a.13(a), as added by 52
Fed. Reg. 16220, 16226-28 (May I, 1987).
10. In mid-1987, well after these remarks were delivered, the executive and legislative
branches took steps that, if brought to full fruition, may reduce the need to apply for formal
asylum. The executive ordered a policy of new generosity toward Nicaraguan asylum seekers. Although the full import of this policy remains to be seen, some have charged that it
represents a decision not to deport anyone to Nicaragua. See Immigration Rules are Eased
for Nicaraguan Exiles in U.S., N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987, at A8. But see also, Refugee
Reports, July 10, 1987, at 7-10. Congress may also enact a broader measure temporarily
blocking deportation of Salvadorans as well as Nicaraguans. H.R. 618, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1987) (Popularly known as the Moakley-Deconcini bill), which so provides, passed the
House in July 1987. See Walsh, House Would Ban Deportation of Some Refugees, Wash.
Post, July 29, 1987, at A4, col. I; 133 Cong. Rec. H6696-6720 (daily ed. July 28, 1987).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/21

4

Martin: The End of De Facto Asylum: Toward a Humane and Realistic Respons

19871

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

III.

THE OPERATION OF THE ASYLUM SYSTEM

Before sketching some favored changes it may be worthwhile to
clarify what the asylum adjudication system is meant to
accomplish.
A.

The Standards

The basic standards for deciding on an application for political
asylum derive from an important treaty, the U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees."1 They were expressly incorporated into U.S. law through the Refugee Act of 1980." To claim
refugee status and thus qualify for asylum, an applicant must prove
that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution in the home
country based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 3
In one sense, we could say that anybody from Guatemala, El
Salvador, or Nicaragua has a well-founded fear of persecution upon
return. Persecution definitely occurs in each of those countries, albeit selectively, following different patterns in each. The fear of
persecution is thus well-founded, not fanciful or irrational. It is
based on the reality of the human rights situation back home. That
fact makes political asylum an agonizing political issue in the
United States and in other Western nations. 4
The U.N. treaty standard, however, was not meant to authorize
relocation of everyone from a country once the government or powerful groups within the country begin to persecute. Typically, asylum countries throughout the developed world require the applicant
to show some greater and more individualized threat. 5 Applicants
for asylum must show some good reason to expect that they, or a
group of which they are a member, will be targeted if they should
return. Of course, controversy then arises in deciding just how
much of a focused threat they must prove, particularly if they come
II. See supra note 3.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980:
Its Past and Future, in TransnationalLegal Problems of Refugees, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
L. STUD. 91.
13. See IN.A. §§ 101(a)(42), 208, 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158, 1253(h)
(1982).
14. See generally Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF 183
(1984); Rudge, Fortress Europe, in World Refugee Survey: 1986 in Review, at 6 (U.S.
Comm. for Refugees, 1987).
15. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 13 (1979).
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from a country where persecution demonstrably does occur. The
Supreme Court has heard arguments on one aspect of this question,
but I do not expect its decision to provide much assistance in clarifying the precise standards to be applied daily by adjudicators.1 6
B.

The Challenge of Adjudication

Asylum adjudicators confront appreciable challenges in making
the difficult decisions that we ask them to make, particularly in
view of the high stakes that may ride on the outcome. Initially, an
adjudicator may find it hard even to determine with assurance what
happened to the applicant or to family or friends thereafter. Applicants may claim, for example, that they received specific threats
that prompted their departure. They may claim that they were incarcerated, beaten, tortured, or that such a fate befell family members or close friends. They may claim involvement in certain political activities before they left, activities that called their
government's attention to them and make targeted sanctions more
likely upon return. But are they telling the truth?
Establishing what really occurred, even at this basic level of retrospective factfinding, poses special challenges. The relevant facts
may be less accessible in asylum cases than in any other administrative proceedings known in U.S. law. After all, we are talking
about events that occurred in distant lands, often in remote portions
of those distant lands. Other witnesses either to impeach or to confirm the applicants's testimony, are usually unavailable. Much depends on skilled questioning of the applicants themselves.
Even if the adjudicator gains confidence in her understanding of
past events, this retrospective fact finding provides only the starting
point. The adjudicator must then move to a second step and predict
what kind of threat those facts now represent should the individual
return. Political conditions change. If the applicant was threatened
16. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) handed down on March 9, 1987,
held that the more generous "well-founded fear" standard applies in asylum cases under
INA § 208, rather than the standard the Board of Immigration Appeals had been using:
whether persecution is "more likely than not." See also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)
(permitting the Board to use the more stringent standard in the closely related setting of
decisions under INA § 243(h)). For a critique of Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca, see T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 664-68. The Cardoza-Fonseca opinion emphasized, however, much was still left to be worked out in case-by-case application: "We do not
attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should be applied." 107 S. Ct. at 1221-22. For the Board's efforts to work out a more detailed description, see e.g., Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985); Matter of Mogharrabi,
Interim Dec. No. 3028 (BIA 1987).
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five years ago in El Salvador, how much of a threat can we expect
that person will face upon return now?
Each of us, if we were going to try to make those judgments,
would doubtless wish for considerably more information than is
typically available. At a minimum, we would want a full opportunity to ask good, thorough questions, in order to test the claimant's
story and construct the best foundation possible to judge what really happened back home. Then, in order to make the required predictive judgment, we would probably prefer expert assistance. Even
better, we might wish to be experts ourselves about current political
and social conditions within the applicant's country of origin. Such
expertise would also help at the first stage, enabling us to pose exact questions that would help to evaluate the witness's account.

IV.

THE LIMITS OF THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL

Our current system does a poor job of promoting informed questioning or furnishing expertise to the decision-makers. Asylum decisions are initially made by examiners within the INS district office.
Often these officials have rotated into the asylum examiner position
only recently and will cycle out again after a year or two. Immigration judges also hear and decide asylum claims, but making asylum
decisions is only one among a great many other responsibilities they
shoulder in the course of their ordinary business. The State Department plays an advisory role, but its advice is based only on a cold
record-the documents the applicant has filed, plus perhaps notes
from the examiner's initial interview. Of course, the State Department could be a source of useful expertise in judging the application. But only rarely does it have independent information about
the applicant or the local events that underlie the claim. Moreover,
there is a persistent risk that diplomatic considerations will skew
17
the Department's position.
Finally, the adversarial model to which the immigration court
hearing conforms exacerbates the difficulties. For an adversarial
system to function well, one needs expertise not only on the part of
the adjudicator, who must ultimately evaluate the facts and the future risks, but also on the part of the parties' advocates. These ad17. Charges of such bias are abundant. See e.g., Helton, Political Asylum Under the
1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 5; U.S. COMMITTEE

FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS

SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 6-11 (1986). See generally Zamora v.

INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1986).
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vocates play a crucial role in creating the record on which the evaluation will be based, a role that becomes more critical the more the
adjudicator conforms his behavior to the classic model of the passive judge or referee. An adversary system, ideally, needs expertise
from the applicant's advocate so that direct examination can effectively flush out the elements of the story presented, often inarticulately and with hesitation, by the asylum seeker. But expertise is
also required of the government attorney doing the cross examination, in order to prove beyond the applicant's initial statement and
expose any fraud or exaggeration--or indeed to reveal the strength
and honesty of the account.
Here lies the great vulnerability of our current system, at least if
it aspires to accuracy and reliability. The relevant expertise, detailed knowledge about conditions in source countries, is far too
scarce. One cannot expect three participants (two advocates and
one judge) to have it in any but unusual circumstances. Perhaps we
should devote resources instead to making absolutely sure that at
least one is thus equipped. If so, that one person must obviously be
the adjudicator, who with a slight change to a less adversarial mode
of procedure, could also pose questions of the supportive or testing
type, as the situation requires. 8
Despite good-faith efforts on the part of many who are involved
in our current system, this country cannot now provide consistently
high-quality adjudications. We need exactly that sort of quality and
reliability if we are to redeem our tradition as a nation of asylum,
and also respond with confidence to any new asylum crisis.
V.

THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

A few years ago, I had an opportunity to study asylum adjudication systems in Western Europe. Many of those systems have serious problems of their own. Asylum applications are running at a
18. Asylum proceedings in the district office already proceed in a nonadversarial fashion, at least in most districts. The examiner poses the questions and the applicant responds.
If an attorney is present, his or her role is usually confined to consultation and advice. In the
other asylum forum, immigration judges have the statutory authority to take the initiative in
questioning. See I.N.A. §§ 236(a), 242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1252(b) (1982) (special
inquiry officers, now called immigration judges, have authority in exclusion and deportation
proceedings to "present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the
alien or witnesses"). Whether they do so varies from judge to judge, but the more passive,
judge-like role has become increasingly common, particularly if both sides are represented by
counsel or other advocate. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 87-91. Courts
have developed workable standards for assuring fairness in nonadvesarial proceedings. See,
e.g., Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 892, 895 (Ist Cir. 1984).
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per capita level far beyond what this country has ever experienced.
In some countries applications are being filed at a rate twenty times
the U.S. rate, causing substantial political strains. Asylum remains
a highly controversial and volatile subject in nearly all Western European countries.' 9 Nearly all European systems that I studied,
however, have one significant advantage over ours. The key decisions are made by specialists, officers whose only job is adjudicating
asylum claims.
Most applications are judged on the basis of an interview where
the specialist does the questioning. It is not an adversarial process;
hence it is not dependent on the skill or training of two other players. The adjudicators are specially selected and then trained for
their work, sometimes in extended programs that stretch over several months. Moreover, several European nations permit their adjudicators to specialize further, judging applications only from a particular region or a particular country. When this arrangement is
possible, it offer obvious benefits for precision and accuracy. Some
nations recruit their officers on this basis, seeking, for example, individuals with graduate training in South Asian studies to adjudicate asylum cases from that region. In several countries, adjudicators also receive impressive support from well-staffed
documentation centers.' 0
I attended on particularly impressive interview session in Switzerland. The applicant was Turkish, and the deciding officer's
caseload consisted of nothing but Turkish asylum applications. The
officer, I later learned, had lived in Turkey for three years and had
done advanced graduate work in Turkish studies. Some of his questions were the kind that any skilled generalist lawyer could pose
after studying the dossier, simply probing evident soft spots in the
story. But other questions revealed a deeper knowledge. The adjudicator obviously knew, independently, many details about the particular events at issue in the region of Turkey from which the applicant came. Thus, he was able to ask precise questions that went
well beyond the papers, questions that the applicant probably could
not have anticipated.
19. See. e.g., Come for Asylum, Go into Orbit, The Economist, April 18, 1987, at 41;
sources cited in supra note 14.
20. See generally EUROPEAN CONSULTATION ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, ASYLUM IN
EUROPE: A HANDBOOK FOR AGENCIES ASSISTING REFUGEES (3d ed. 1983); Martin, Comparative Policies on Political Asylum: Of Facts and Law, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN
(1987); Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19 STAN.
INT' L.J. 235 (1983).
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CONCLUSION

Serious proposals have been offered to move the U.S. asylum system in this direction. 2 1 They have yet to achieve acceptance. Perhaps such change will come only if more people appreciate the genuine need for high-quality adjudication in this elusive field. IRCA
could unwittingly spread that feeling, although perhaps only after
months or years during which a newly overloaded system functions
poorly.
There is an alternative scenario. Constructive change could also
come, in advance of crisis, through the efforts of the organized bar.
Such efforts will need support from a broader spectrum than
merely that subculture of the bar comprised of immigration lawyers. I am pleased that the ABA Standing Committee, which called
us together for this symposium, sees these issues as relevant to "law
and national security." That action may constitute one important
step toward enlisting a wider audience in the quest for asylum
reform.

21. For example, a proposal for somewhat greater specialization for asylum adjudicators was included in the early Simpson-Mazzoli bills, the precursors of IRCA, but the authors dropped this matter from the 1986 version of the legislation, in order to minimize
controversy. See e.g., S. 2222, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., § 124 (1982). Just before this article
went to press, INS also proposed new asylum regulations that would assign asylum decisionmaking to specialized asylum officers directly supervised by the INS central office, 52 Fed.
Reg. 32552 (Aug. 28, 1987). Although generally quite progressive, the proposed regulations
leave open several questions about the qualifications, training, and genuine independence of
the asylum office.
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